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RESUMEN 
Este trabajo modeliza conjuntamente la evolución del acatamiento de la regulación y del 
stock de un recurso de libre acceso en el contexto de un proceso evolutivo que combina el 
mecanismo de "replicator dynamics", para describir la adopción de políticas de captura, con 
la dinámica del stock del recurso. Este enfoque evolutivo determina la aparición de políticas 
de captura de equilibrio en estado estacionario o niveles de acatamiento bajo la regulación, y 
el correspondiente comportamiento del stock de equilibrio del recurso en estado estacionario. 
Este enfoque evolutivo sugiere que es posible la coexistencia de estrategias cooperativas y 
no cooperativas en un contexto en que existe regulación. Se muestra que el efecto del stock 
sobre los beneficios, junto con una cierta estructura de las probabilidades de ser auditado, 
pueden implicar la aparición de un ciclo límite en zonas de bajos niveles de stock, como un 
resultado de equilibrio para el nivel de acatamiento y el stock de biomasa. También se 
muestra que es posible modificar la regulación modificando las penalizaciones asociadas al 
incumplimiento de la regulación, a fin de lograr equilibrios con acatamiento completo y salir 
del equilibrio con bajos niveles de stock. Asimismo se pone de manifiesto que podría ser más 
fácil para el regulador obtener el acatamiento completo si existe un compromiso de 
mantener unas probabilidades  de supervisión prefijadas. 
 




The present paper models jointly the evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution 
of the CPR stock in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining 
replicator dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource stock 
dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of steady-state 
equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels under regulation, and the corresponding 
behavior of the steady-state equilibrium resource stock. This evolutionary approach suggests 
that coexistence of both cooperative and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. 
It is shown that stock effects on profits and a certain structure of auditing probabilities, could 
imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equilibrium outcome 
for the level of compliance and the biomass stock.  It is also shown that it is possible to 
modify regulation, by modifying penalties for regulatory violations, in order to attain full 
compliance equilibria and take the system out of low stock traps. It shown it might be easier 
for the regulator to obtain the full compliance if there is precommitment to fixed auditing 
probabilities. 
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Common pool resources (CPR) can be described as stocks of natural capital
that generate ﬂows of useful goods and services to humans1 and share two
main characteristics:
1. It is costly to exclude individuals from beneﬁting from the ﬂows of
goods and services associated with the resource stocks.
2. Once a resource unit is harvested from the CPR by an individual, this
unit is not available to other individuals. This is the substractability
property.
Design of institutions to exclude potential beneﬁciaries from harvesting
the resource is not easy, thus many CPR have open access characteristics.2
As is well known in the analysis of open access resources, a negative appropri-
ation externality stems from the fact that individual harvesting ignores the
impact of individual harvesting on ther e s o u r c es t o c k .I nh a r v e s t i n gaC P R ,
∗Paper presented at the Sevilla Workshop on Dynamic Economics and the Environ-
ment, Sevilla, Spain, July 2003.
1See, for example, Ostrom, Gardner and Walker (1993).
2A CPR is typically associated with a ﬁxed number of potential beneﬁciaries or users,
while for an open access resource this restriction does apply.
1individual appropriators could in the absence of appropriate institutions, en-
gage in “scramble competition” to appropriate the resource before someone
else does and ignore the impact of their actions on the resource stock. For
example, in a ﬁshery, individual harvesting reduces stocks and increases unit
harvesting costs for all appropriators. In groundwater management, individ-
ual pumping reduces the water head and increases unit pumping costs for all
individuals. The non-cooperative outcome obtained when each appropriator
maximizes individual beneﬁts without taking into account the negative ap-
propriation externality is Pareto inferior to a cooperative outcome where total
beneﬁts are maximized and in this way the externality is internalized.3 This
non-cooperative outcome can be associated with historical resource overex-
ploitation and collapses of stocks.4
The overexploitation of a CPR leads to the need for a regulatory frame-
work.5 In a ﬁshery, probably the most well-studied case, at a theoretical
level, optimal regulation can be designed by comparing the non-cooperative
ﬁshing eﬀort with the corresponding cooperative eﬀort and then using in-
struments to achieve the cooperative outcome. In practice, such instruments
include limits on entry, gear restrictions, area closures, seasonal restrictions,
individual transferable quotas (ITQ), total allowable catch (TAC), quotas
for important species, minimum landing size, minimum mesh size, by-catch
rules, landing fees.6 A typical property of the economic instruments is that
they can sustain decentralized regulation. That is, once they are properly
enforced and monitored, the individual appropriators follow the cooperative
behavior dictated by the regulation, and the system converges to the desired
socially-optimal steady state.
Of course it is not realistic to assume that all agents will follow regu-
lation, especially if the number of agents is large. In ﬁshery management
there is a tendency to support the idea that regulation has diﬃculties in
protecting ﬁsheries from overexploitation. This opinion is supported by real
3There is extensive literature on this issue. See, for example, Gordon (1954), Hard-
ing (1968) for the “tragedy of the commons,” Smith (1968), Negri (1989), Clark (1990)
andOstrom (1993).
4See Jackson et. al. (2001). Also, FAO estimates that currently 71 - 78 percent of ﬁsh
stocks are fully exploited, overexploited or recovering from depletion.
5In the absence of regulation, and given that the appropriation externality appears as
stock eﬀects in harvesting costs, the appropriators’ eﬀort or harvesting will be higher, the
less the individuals take into account the eﬀects of their actions on total stocks. If stock
eﬀects are completely ignored, in the sense that the appropriators are myopic and treat
t h er e s o u r c es t o c ka saﬁxed parameter, then individual harvesting, at least in the short
run, will be set at the maximum possible level relative to the cooperative rule.
6See, for example, Conrad and Clark (1987) Clark (1990), and Homans and Wilen
(1997).
2evidence regarding quota busting, data fouling and in general noncompliance
behavior.7 In particular, typical violations of regulations involve illegal catch
or landings, misreporting landings, violation of by-catches rules, discards of
ﬁsh, ﬁshing without licence, landing of protected stocks, misreported catch
areas.8
The behavior of a ﬁsher, regarding compliance or noncompliance can be
modeled by following Becker’s (1968) general approach, under which a ﬁsher
will decide to comply or not by comparing expected beneﬁts from noncompli-
ance, including any expected penalty if audited, with the expected beneﬁts
from compliance. Compliance behavior in CPRs has been also modelled, fol-
lowing mainly Ostrom (1990), in the context of institution formation within
the appropriators of the CPR that allows the imposition on sanctions to
noncompliers. Sethi and Somanathan (1996) consider the evolution of social
norms for CPR and show that cooperative behavior guided by norms of re-
straint and punishment may be a stable outcome of an evolutionary process,
against con cooperative behavior.
In the present paper compliance or noncompliance, or equivalently the
decision to follow the cooperative or the noncooperative harvesting rule, is
modelled by assuming that appropriators are expected to choose their har-
vesting rule in an evolutionary way, by considering the evolution of their
proﬁts, taking into account the probability of paying a ﬁne if audited and
found not to comply with regulation. This type of rule can be associated with
a process noted by Ostrom (1990) which indicates that "the most one can
say is that individuals ... are engaged in a trial-and-error eﬀort to learn more
about the results of their actions so that they can evaluate beneﬁts and costs
more eﬀectively over time". Proﬁts in general are aﬀected by the deviation
between harvesting levels with or without compliance, by stock eﬀects on
unit costs, since these eﬀects are eventually most likely to be realized in a
dynamic context, by the size of the probabilistic ﬁne and the probability of
been audited. If following the non-cooperative strategy implies proﬁtr e d u c -
tion relative to the average proﬁts of the appropriators’ group, the appropri-
ator will choose the cooperative strategy and vice-versa. Since a CPR with a
ﬁxed large number of appropriators and two possible strategies is examined,
this evolutionary assumption implies that a replicator dynamics framework
should be adopted to describe the evolution of appropriator shares that fol-
low cooperative or non-cooperative strategies.9 The steady-state equilibrium
resource level and harvesting rule will be the outcome of this evolutionary
7See, for example, Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003).
8For example, Jensen and Vestergaard (2002), Eggert and Ellegard (2003).
9For the use of the replicator dynamic methodology coupled with stock dynamics in a
CPR problem, see also Sethi and Somanathan (1996).
3process. Thus the evolution of harvesting rules could in principle lead to full
adoption of a single rule (cooperative or non-cooperative), or equivalently full
compliance or not, but also coexistence of both rules in equilibrium, that is
partial compliance. Once the mechanism resulting in no compliance or par-
tial compliance is characterized, regulation could be adjusted in order to steer
the system towards the adoption of the cooperative rule, or full compliance.
Therefore the contribution of this paper lies in that it models jointly the
evolution of compliance to regulation and the evolution of the CPR stock
in the context of an evolutionary process emerging from combining replica-
tor dynamics, which describe the adoption of harvesting rules, with resource
stock dynamics. This evolutionary approach characterizes the emergence of
steady-state equilibrium harvesting rules or compliance levels under regula-
tion, and the corresponding behavior of the steady-state equilibrium resource
stock. Thus the present paper does not seek to model the evolution of insti-
tutions or social norms in CPR harvesting, but rather to model the outcome
of regulation. This outcome is analyzed in terms of compliance levels and
resource stock, when decisions to comply or not are taken in an evolutionary
way, based on the evolution of proﬁts associated with diﬀerent compliance
decisions among appropriators, over a suﬃciently long time period.
This evolutionary approach suggests that coexistence of both coopera-
tive and non-cooperative rules under regulation is possible. It is shown that
stock eﬀects on proﬁts and a certain structure of auditing probabilities, could
imply the emergence of a limit cycle in areas of low stock levels, as an equi-
librium outcome for the level of compliance and the biomass stock. Given
the observed ﬂuctuations in the biomass of ﬁsheries, and regulatory failures,
the evolutionary mechanism developed in this paper could be regarded as
explaining such periodic ﬂuctuations in stocks and levels of compliance.10 It
is also shown that it is possible to modify regulation, by modifying penalties
for regulatory violations, in order to attain full compliance equilibria and
take the system out of low stock traps. It shown it might be more easy for
the regulator to obtain the full compliance if there is precommitment to ﬁxed
auditing probabilities.
2H a r v e s t i n g R u l e s
We start by brieﬂy characterizing competitive (that is, non-cooperative) and
socially-optimal (that is, cooperative) harvesting rules for a CPR ﬁshery with
10This of course does not diminish the importance of environmental factors in biomass
ﬂuctuations.
4i =1 ,...,n appropriators.11 Let resource dynamics be described by




where hi denotes harvesting by harvester or appropriator i, at time t, H
denotes total harvesting at time t, and F (S) is the biomass growth function
with the usual inverted “U” properties, F (0) = F (Smax)=0 ,F 0 (S0)=0 ,
F
00 (S) < 0 for 0 ≤ S ≤ Smax. As usual Smax denotes carrying capacity and
S0 the biomass level corresponding to maximum sustainable yield. Assuming
general nonlinear stock eﬀects and that individual harvesters face a ﬁxed
market price (for example the world price) for the harvested resource, the
appropriator’s proﬁt ﬂow is determined as
πi = phi − ci (hi,S) (2)
The cost function is strictly convex and increasing in harvesting and de-
creasing in S due to stock eﬀects. In a non-cooperative equilibrium each
harvester maximizes proﬁts by considering the biomass stock as a ﬁxed para-



























It follows from the envelop theorem that the proﬁt function is positively









To deﬁne cooperative or socially-optimal harvesting, welfare from total
harvest H, is deﬁned, assuming symmetry, as the sum of consumer and pro-
ducer surplus or U (H)=S (Y ) − nc(h,S), where S (Y )=
R nh
0 P (u)du is
the area under the demand curve p = P (H) and S0 (H)=P (H)=p. The






−δt[S (Y ) − nc(h,S)]dt , H = nh s. t. (1) (6)
The current value Hamiltonian for this problem is deﬁned as
H =S (Y ) − nc(h,S)+µ[F (S) − H]
11For detailed modeling see, for example, Smith (1968) and Clark (1990).
5where the costate variable µ is interpreted as the resource stock shadow




















along with (1) and the transversality condition at inﬁn i t y .A si sc o m m o ni n
these problems, by diﬀerentiating (7) and substituting into (8), we determine
the dynamic ﬁshery system in the state - control space (S,h). Assume that
a steady-state equilibrium (S∗,H∗) exists, which has the usual saddle point
property. Then the policy function H∗
t = Q(St) is determined by the stable
manifold converging to (S∗,H∗). The policy function can be used by the
regulation to design the socially-optimal quota system. The corresponding
quota for each harvester is then hC
t = H∗
t /n. This socially-optimal harvesting
rule hC is announced to the appropriators and they are expected to follow
the rule, harvesting hC
t per period. Thus under optimal regulation the proﬁt







Therefore, the proﬁto rp a y o ﬀ function for each appropriator under non-












respectively. The harvesting rules, or harvesting strategies, are divergent in
the sense that for any given biomass stock S, and for µ>0, it holds that
hN >h C. It should be noted that πC ¡
hC,S
¢




eﬀects could be realized even through the socially-optimal rule, in the sense
that if stock are reduced, because say the majority of the appropriators do
not follow the socially-optimal rule, then proﬁts will fall, since the harvesters
that follow hC are trying to harvest this amount from lower stocks.
3 Replicator Dynamics and the Evolutionary
Adoption of Harvesting Rules




number of i =1 ,...,n harvesters, we seek to model the evolution of the
6adoption of the harvesting rules and the interaction of this evolution with
the evolution of the resource biomass.12
L e tt h es t a t ev e c t o rx(t)=( xN (t),x C (t)) denote the share of the total
population of harvesters following non-cooperative or cooperative harvesting
rules respectively at time t. If a regulator follows the cooperative harvesting




On the other hand a harvester can choose not to comply with regulation,13
that is to follow the non-cooperative rule hN. In this case, if audited (caught),
he/she is liable for a ﬁne.
A harvester’s subjective probability of being audited can be deﬁned in a
general form by φ(z), where z is a vector of parameters. It is assumed that
this probability is common for all harvesters. This probability can be further
speciﬁed by making additional assumptions.
In the ﬁrst case the regulator exercises ﬁxed monitoring eﬀort and makes
a ﬁxed number of inspections, say ¯ n p e rp e r i o d . I nd o i n gs ot h er e g u l a t o r
announces this policy and thus precommits to a certain auditing probability
which is known by the harvesters. The regulator sticks to the policy and the
harvesters know this policy. In this case the audit probability is ﬁxed, or14
φ(z) ≡ ¯ φ (11)
An alternative assumption would be that the regulator exercises variable
monitoring eﬀort, which depends on global variables of the problem that the
regulator can observe.15 One such variable is the resource stock S, another
variable is the share of violators v detected during an audit. The regulator
increases the monitoring eﬀo r ti ft h es t o c ki sr e d u c e do rt h es h a r eo fv i o l a t o r s
increases. This policy can be regarded as a type of no full commitment - or
partiall commitment - auditing policy on the regulator’s part. The regulator
might for example not audit individual harvesters if the stocks are suﬃciently
high, but the regulator might start inspecting if stocks fall below a certain
12It should be noticed that what follows applies to any two distinct harvesting rules
independent of how they have been deﬁned. Noncooperative and cooperative optimization
is used in order to deﬁne these rules, since this approach relates more to the traditional
regulation theory.
13Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) report about Danish ﬁshers that conﬂicts in the normal
pattern of ﬁshing and the pattern of ﬁshing implied by regulation has a major impact in
their compliance behavior.
14This is a common assumption in the enforcement literature in environmental economics
(e.g. Malik, 1993; Garvie and Keeler, 1994; Segerson and Miceli, 1998; Stranlund and
Dhana, 1999).
15In the enforcement literature, variable monitoring eﬀort is usually related to ﬁrm
speciﬁc variables (e.g. Malik, 1990; VanEgteren and Weber, 1996).
7level.16 The harvesters are made aware of the results of the inspections,
say through public announcements and/or private communications,17 and
perceive that if the stock is reduced or the share of violators increases more
eﬀort will be exercised and thus the subjective probability of being audited




(S) < 0, (φ(S
∗),φ(0)) > 0 (12)
If harvesters use the observed v as an estimate for xN, that is they set
v = xN, a compliance dependent auditing probability is deﬁned as:
φ(z) ≡ φ(xN),φ
0
(S) > 0, (φ(1),φ(0)) > 0 (13)
If (12) and (13) are taken together, a more general formulation for the
subjective audit probability with joint dependence on compliance and stocks
would be:
φ(z) ≡ φ(xN,S) (14)
In this framework the payoﬀ when the non-cooperative rule is followed,












where F > 0 is a ﬁxed penalty.18 Under these assumptions the average proﬁt
ﬂow associated with the CPR is deﬁned, using the fact that xN +xC =1 , as:















Suppose that in every time period dt each appropriator, say i, following a
certain strategy hN or hC, learns the proﬁt, and consequently the harvesting
strategy, of another randomly chosen appropriator, say j, with probability
αdt > 0.19 The appropriator will change his/her strategy to the other strat-
egy if he/she perceives that the other’s proﬁt is higher because he/she follows
16Grieson and Singh (1990), Khalil, (1997), and Franckx (2002) analyze no commitment
frameworks. Franckx relates individual auditing to the level of ambient pollution which is
a global state variable. An environmental regulator chooses which ﬁrm to inspect without
observing ﬁrms’ action but after observing ambient pollution.
17In their survey Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) report that " ﬁshers observe the activities
and movements of the enforcement agents and continously report to their peers about it."
18In an empirical study of Danish ﬁshers, Nielsen and Mathiesen (2003) sugest that
among the major factors aﬀecting compliance in ﬁsheries are: (i) the economic gains to
be obtained from noncompliance, (ii) the risk of being detected and the severity of the
sanction. In (15) factor (i) is captured by the term πN ¡
hN,S
¢
, while factor (ii) is captured
by the term φ(z)F.
19See Gintis (2000) for use of this approach in order to derive the replicator dynamic.
8the other harvesting strategy. The higher the diﬀerence between the payoﬀs,
the higher the probability that the appropriator will perceive it and change
his/her harvesting rule. The probability of an appropriator i using nonco-









for πtC > ΠtN
0 for πtC ≤ ΠtN
Following Gintis (2000) the expected proportion of the population following












































tN − ¯ π
t¢
(18)
For a large population, Ex
t+dt
N can be replaced by x
t+dt
N , substracting xt
N
from both sides of (18), dividing by dt and taking the limit as dt → 0, and









tN − ¯ π
t¢
(19)
The replicator dynamic indicates that the share of harvesters following
non-cooperative harvesting rules increases over time if non-cooperative proﬁts
increase relative to cooperative proﬁts and vice versa. The replicator dynamic
can be written, using the payoﬀ deﬁnitions and dropping t, as:















Replicator dynamics equation (20) describes the evolution of harvesters
that violate regulation. Since the evolution of the resource biomass is aﬀected
by the harvesting rule choice, its evolution will be determined by
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(21)
The dynamical system (20), (21) can be used to analyze the evolution
of harvesting rules and resource stock towards an evolutionary equilibrium,
20See also for example, Taylor and Jonkar (1978), Weibull (1995) and Samuelson (1997).
9that determines the share of appropriators following cooperative or non-
cooperative harvesting rules, and the resource biomass. The equilibrium
harvesting rule could be monomorphic if all harvesters are following the same
rule, or polymorphic if both cooperative and non-cooperative rules coexist
in equilibrium.21 Two possible cases are examined. In the ﬁrst proﬁts are
not aﬀected by changes in the stocks, while in the second stock eﬀects are
present so that a reduction in the resource stock reduces individual proﬁts.
4 Evolution of Harvesting Rules without Stock
Eﬀects
In analyzing the ﬁr s tc a s ew ea s s u m et h a th a r v e s t i n gr u l e sh a v eb e e ns e ta t
some point in time in the sense that harvesting quotas have been set by a
regulator at the level hC, in response to non-cooperative proﬁt maximizing
harvesting at the level hN. Once these two rules are applied, stock eﬀects
are completely ignored and behavior regarding rule adoption is determined
by the evolution equation (20). This assumption can be thought of as a
situation in which the agents have been “hard wired” at the strategies hN





= γ>0, independent of xN and S. We examine the
evolution of harvesting rules under ﬁxed and variable auditing probabilities.
4.1 Fixed auditing probability
Assume that the auditing probability is ﬁxed as given in (11). Then the
dynamic system (20), (21) becomes:
˙ xN =( 1 − xN)xN
¡
γ − ¯ φF
¢
(22)
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(23)
In this case the system (22), (23) has a hierachical structure, so that the
equilibrium of (22) can be determined ﬁrst and then used to determine the
equilibrium of (23).
21It should be noted that in this setup the regulator does not optimize with respect to the
choice of auditing probabilities or ﬁnes. Auditing probabilities and ﬁnes take arbitrary
values and the regulator could change them if a speciﬁc compliance level, which is not
attained by the current values of these parameters, is required.
22Stock eﬀects could be absent if changes in S cause no change in the density of the
stock (Smith 1968).
10Since xN ∈ [0,1], it can easily be seen from (22) that there are two
admissible equilibria x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 . Denote δ =
¡
γ − ¯ φF
¢
, by taking the
derivative of (22) we obtain
d˙ x
dx
= δ(1 − 2x)
Evaluating it at x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0it follows that
if δ>0 x∗
1N =1is stable, x∗
2N =0 , is unstable
f δ>0 x∗
1N =1is unstable, x∗
2N =0 , is stable
This result can be summarized in the following proposition
Proposition 1 Under precommitment to a ﬁxed auditing probability ¯ φ, the
evolutionary stable equilibrium harvesting rule is monomorphic. All har-
vesters violate regulation if F <γ / ¯ φ. All harvesters follow regulation, that
is, a full compliance equilibrium exists if the ﬁne and the auditing probability
are chosen such that F >γ / ¯ φ.
Thus the level of that ﬁn ec a nb es e e na sab i f u r c a t i o np a r a m e t e r .T h e r ei s
a critical level Fcr = γ/¯ φ, such that for ﬁnes larger than the critical level the
steady-state equilibrium is characterized by full compliance, while for ﬁnes
less than the critical level none follows regulation in equilibrium. A similar
role can be played by the auditing probability. In this case ¯ φ
cr = γ/F.23














T h ea p p r o a c hd y n a m i c sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e1 af o rδ>0, and in ﬁgure 1b for
δ<0 where the ˙ xN =0corresponds to the two isoclines, x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 .




Smsy =a r gm a x S F (s). In ﬁgures 1a and 1b it is assumed that xN (Smsy) > 1,
while in ﬁgure 1c it is assumed that xN (Smsy) < 1.which implies that resource
growth is weak.
[Figure 1]
23Sutinen et al (1990) suggestes that the high level of noncompliance in the US ground-
ﬁsh ﬁshery can be explained by low economic sanctions. In terms of our model this
observation agrees with our result that full compliance can be attained by suﬃciently high
expected ﬁnes.
11In ﬁgure 1a, A is stable while B is unstable, with the reverse charac-
terization in ﬁgure 1b. Figure 1c has been drawn under the assumption
that x∗
2N =0is the stable equilibrium. It should be noted that if initial
conditions are such that trajectory TR1 is relevant, then the monomorphic
compliance equilibrium is attained. If however trajectory TR 2 is relevant,
then the resource will collapse before equilibrium is reached. This result can
be associated with the timing of introducing regulation, and indicates that
if the resource is already at low levels and largely unregulated, that is, there
is a high proportion of harvesters that do not follow regulation, then a very
strict regulation might not help to prevent resource collapse while a laxer
regulation might have helped if it had been applied when the resource stock
was suﬃciently large.
The results of this section indicate that without a suﬃciently large ﬁne,
the cooperative harvesting rule is not sustainable as a long-run monomorphic
evolutionary equilibrium. Resource extinction is possible even with stringent
regulation if the resource growth is weak and it is applied to low stocks
o fal a r g e l yu n r e g u l a t e dr e s o u r c e . T h er e s u l tt h a tf u l lc o m p l i a n c ec a nb e
attained by suﬃciently high expected ﬁnes is supported by ideas developed
through empirical observation. Sutinen et al. (1990) suggest that the high
level of noncompliance in the US groundﬁsh ﬁshery can be explained by low
economic sanctions. Eggert and Ellerant (2003) claim that the decision of
large scale industrial ﬁshers in Sweden to comply is based mainly on economic
considerations and less on moral obligation or peer pressure. They suggest
that increased compliance can be obtained by "severe economic consequences
of rule violation."
4.2 Compliance dependent auditing probability
In this case the auditing probability is given by (12). Then the dynamic
system (20), (21) becomes:
˙ xN =( 1 − xN)xN [γ − φ(xN)F] (24)
˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(25)
The system (24), (25) has again a hierachical structure but there is the
possibility of three equilibria for (24). That is, x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0as above but
also more equilibria, provided that γ−φ(xN)F =0has solutions xN ∈ (0,1).
Depending on the values of γ and F and the structure of φ(xN) there could
be one or more such equilibria.
The stability properties of these equilibria can be characterized in the
following way. Since all admissible equilibria are in the compact and convex
12set [0,1],the function g(xN)=( 1− xN)xN [γ − φ(xN)F] is continuous in
xN, and at x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0the function g(xN) crosses the xN axis, then
if there are more crossings in [0,1] there will be an alternating sequence of
locally stable and locally unstable equilibria. In ﬁgure 2a x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0
are locally unstable while x∗
3N is locally stable. In ﬁgure 2b, x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0
are locally stable, x∗
3N is locally stable.




=( 1− 2x)[γ − φ(xN)F] − xN (1 − xN)φ
0
(xN)F







−[γ − φ(1)F] for x∗
1N =1
[γ − φ(0)F] for x∗
2N =0
−x∗






If there are more than three equilibria, then in general there is an al-
ternating sequence of locally stable and locally unstable equilibria, or vice
versa. Ultimately.the number and the type of the equilibria depend on γ, φ
and φ(xN).
[Figure 2]
This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 2 Assuming compliance dependent auditing probability there is
a possibility of evolutionary stable polymorphic harvesting equilibria










Then for a suﬃciently large ﬁne, equilibria other than 0 and 1 can be elim-
inated by the regulator. In this case the stability properties are determined
by the signs of −[γ − φ(1)F] for x∗
1N =1 , and [γ − φ(0)F] for x∗
2N =0 .
For a suﬃciently large ﬁne and positive φ(0), the monomorphic full compli-
ance equilibrium is evolutionary stable. As in the case of the ﬁxed auditing
probability the level of ﬁne behaves as a bifurcation parameter.
Substituting the equilibria of (24) into (25) we obtain the steady state
o ft h er e s o u r c es t o c k .T h er e s u l t sa r es h o w ni nF i g u r e3 .I nﬁgure 3a there
is polymorphic stable compliance equilibrium at point C, points A and B
13are unstable monomorphic equilibria, while in ﬁgure 3b the compliance equi-
librium is monomorphic (everybody either complies with regulation or not).
This equilibrium depends on initial conditions. The stable monomorphic
equilibria are A and B.I n c r e a s i n gt h eﬁne to eliminate a stable polymorphic
equilibrium in terms of ﬁgure 3a implies that the x∗
3N =0shifts down to the
negative part of the xN axis . Then the basin of attraction for the stable
monomorphic full compliance equilibrium x∗
2N =0is the whole [0,1] space.
As in the case of the ﬁxed auditing probability if xN (Smsy) < 1, then for cer-
tain initial conditions indicating low stock and lax monitoring, the resource
might collapse despite the introduction of stringent regulation.
[Figure 3]
5S t o c k E ﬀects and the Evolution of Harvest-
ing Rules
A more realistic representation of the CPR problems implies that we should
allow for changes in the stock of the biomass to aﬀect the appropriators’ prof-
its, through stock eﬀects in the unit harvesting costs. We maintain, however,
the assumption that there is no smooth dependence of the harvesting rule
on the stock of the biomass. Thus the behavioral assumption regarding the
appropriators is that although they realize changes in their proﬁts and asso-
ciate these changes with changes in the stock, they stick to their harvesting
rule as long as by sticking to the rule their proﬁts are not below the proﬁts
of the harvester with which they randomly mach. If individual proﬁts are
suﬃciently below the proﬁts of the other harvester, there is a switch of the
harvesting rule, and the proportion of appropriators following the new rule
starts to increase. Thus appropriators do not continuously adjust their har-
vesting rules to changes in stocks and their individual proﬁts, unless proﬁts
accruing from the speciﬁc harvesting rule fall suﬃciently short of the proﬁts
of another randomly chosen harvester. In this case the evolutionary system
can be deﬁned as:











˙ S = F (S) − n
£
xNh
N +( 1− xN)h
C¤
(27)
The evolutionary system (26) and (27) is analyzed under two alternative
assumptions regarding the structure of the subjective auditing probability.
14Under stock dependent probabilities (12),24 the replicator dynamics (26)
is written as











The isocines corresponding to (26) are deﬁned as x∗
1N =1 ,x ∗
2N =0 , and,



























We assume that ∂πN
∂S − ∂πC
∂S > 0, so that stock eﬀects are relatively stronger
under non-cooperative harvesting rules. Then
∂ψ(S)
∂S > 0 and dS∗
dF > 0. The
steady-state equilibria are shown in Figure 4. The fact that
∂ψ(S)
∂S > 0 implies
that ˙ xN > 0 to the right of S∗, while ˙ xN < 0 to the left of S∗. Therefore the
x∗
1N =1is attracting for S>S ∗ and repelling for S<S ∗.
[Figure 4]
Stock eﬀects introduce one more steady state to the problem, point E in
ﬁgure 4, in addition to the steady-state equilibria A,B,C, and D. Point A is
locally stable, whereas points B,C, and D are locally unstable.
The critical point E that indicates polymorphic compliance, could, how-
ever, have diﬀerent topological properties than the rest critical points. Point
E is totally unstable, with the directions of the arrows in the four isosectors
around E indicating that the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld (26), (27) is pointing
outwards around E. If a compact positively invariant region R exists, such
that the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld points inwards on the boundary of R, then
according to the Bendixon-Poincare theory,25 a limit cycle exists around E
as shown by L in ﬁgure 4a. The limit cycle might exist for relatively low
resource levels , that is for F
0 (S∗) < 0 or S∗ <S msy. For S∗ >S msy then the
polymorphic equilibrium is stable but the approach path is characterized by
oscillations. These results are summarized in the following proposition.
24Results are qualitatively similar if we consider ﬁxed auditing probabilities.
25See, for example, Sastry (1999, Ch. 2.3). Formally a region R ⊂ R2 is said to be
positively (negatively) invariant for the ﬂow (ζ1t (xN),ζ2t(S)) if, for each (xN,S) ∈ R,
(ζ1t (xN),ζ2t(S)) ∈ R for all t ≥ 0(t ≤ 0). A detailed discussion regarding the existence
of a limit cycle is presented in the Appendix.
15Proposition 3 Under stock dependent subjective auditing probability and
appropriate values of the ﬁne, a limit cycle indicating oscillating polymor-
phic compliance levels and resource stocks could exist for relatively low re-
source stock levels S∗ <S msy. Under the same conditions, for relatively high
resource stock levels S∗ >S msy, a polymorphic compliance steady-state equi-
librium exists. This steady state could be a stable focus with an approach path
that spiral inwards towards S∗, a stable node without spiraling trajectories,
or a saddle point with a one-dimensional stable manifold.
For Proof see Appendix
The intuition behind the existence of the limit cycle, with counterclock-
wise movement, goes as follows. For any given point to the southeast of the
limit cycle L, the proportion of appropriators following non-cooperative har-
vesting increases faster than the resource stock. At some point towards the
top of the cycle, stock starts declining but the proportion of appropriators
following non-cooperative harvesting keeps growing, however at a slower rate.
As stock eﬀects become more severe and the auditing probability increases
with the decline of the stock, the proportion of appropriators following non-
cooperative harvesting is declining on the left side of the cycle. The reduc-
tion of the appropriators following non-cooperative harvesting causes stock
recovery. However as stock recovers at the bottom of the cycle, stock eﬀects
become weaker and the auditing probability is declining, therefore the pro-
portion of appropriators following non-cooperative harvesting starts growing
again, and the cycle goes on.
These results indicate that for a relatively low ﬁne level26 such that
S∗ <S msy, and appropriate initial conditions, the system could be trapped
in a low stock area characterized by oscillations. If a large random shock
shifts the system to the left of the region R in ﬁgure 4a, then the resource
might collapse. On the other hand for initial conditions to the right of R the
system converges to the monomorphic no compliance equilibrium at A. What
is worth noting is that this noncompliance equilibrium is characterized by a
larger resource stock than the polymorphic equilibrium on the limit cycle.
This is a result of the fact that to the right of R the proportion of appropri-
ators following non-cooperative harvesting does not grow much faster than
the resource stock, which is necessary for the generation of the limit cycle.
Thus the resource is accumulated at a rate that allows the stock to move
beyond the Smsy.
For relatively high ﬁnes producing S∗ >S msy a polymorphic equilibrium
could have diﬀerent stability properties. For example at point E of ﬁgure
26Since dS∗
dF > 0, we expect that low ﬁnes result in S∗ <S msy.
164b the approach path is spiraling inwards towards steady-state equilibrium.
Furthermore, and since dS∗
dF > 0, for a suﬃciently high ﬁne, S∗ could be moved
up to point B in ﬁgure 4b, which corresponds to the dashed line. In this case
the monomorphic noncompliance equilibrium,x∗
1N =1 , is repelling for all
relevant resource stocks. Oscillations in compliance and the resource stock
have been eliminated and there is one stable full compliance equilibrium.
This analysis suggests that under stock eﬀects in costs and auditing prob-
abilities, the CPR could, for relatively low ﬁnes, exhibit periodic oscillations
around a relatively low resource stock, given appropriate initial conditions or
random shocks that could move initial values into the region R. By increas-
ing the ﬁne suﬃciently a full compliance monomorphic equilibrium can be
attained.
The problem can be analyzed in terms of a more complicated subjective
auditing probability structure with both compliance eﬀects and stock eﬀects.
In this case φ(z)=φ(xN,S) and











The evolutionary system is now given by (30) and (27). The analysis is
basically a combination of the approaches followed above. There is a new
isocine deﬁned as










− φ(xN,S)F =0 (31)
Under appropriate conditions on the functions and the ﬁne, this isocine could
generate two steady states like F and G in ﬁgure 3a. These steady states
are induced by the dashed line WW, which is the isocine corresponding to
(31). The structure and the properties of the steady states can be analyzed
using the same tools as above. Although the system is more complex, the
properties of the steady states and the policy implications are in general
similar to those derived above.
6 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this paper was to examine the evolution of harvesting rules for
a CPR which is subject to regulation. The two possible harvesting rules ex-
amined were: (i) a non-cooperative rule, which can be thought of as emerging
from non-cooperative optimization, where the appropriators of the resource
ignore the eﬀects of their actions on the resource stock and the production
set of the others, and (ii) a cooperative rule which can be thought of as
emerging from social welfare optimization, and then used in the form of a
17quota for decentralized resource regulation. Appropriators are liable for a
probabilistic ﬁne if they violate regulation. The basic behavioral assumption
is an evolutionary one, namely that the share of appropriators following a
certain rule increases if, by sticking to the rule, individual proﬁts increase
relative to average group proﬁts. If individual proﬁts are reduced relative
to average group proﬁts, then some appropriators are expected to switch to
the alternative rule. We combine the evolutionary process of harvesting rule
adoption with biomass dynamics to study the steady-state equilibrium har-
vesting rules, which is equivalent to studying compliance to regulation, and
the corresponding steady-state resource stock.
Our results depend on the structure of the subjective auditing probabil-
ity and whether stock eﬀects on proﬁts are realized or not. The equilibrium
harvesting rule is homogeneous, indicating monomorphic full compliance to
the cooperative harvesting rule or no compliance at all, when auditing prob-
abilities are ﬁxed and stock eﬀects are not present. Still without stock eﬀects
but with compliance dependent auditing probabilities a polymorphic com-
pliance steady state could be achieved. In general a suﬃciently high ﬁne
c a nb ec h o s e ns u c ht h a tt h ec o o p e r a t i v er u l ei sf o l l o w e db ye v e r y b o d yi n
equilibrium.
When stock eﬀects are present there is the possibility that a mix of co-
operative and non-cooperative behavior will be a steady-state equilibrium
outcome. Since stock eﬀects on proﬁts act as a stimulant, the possibility
of a limit cycle in a region of low biomass exists, when subjective auditing
probabilities are stock dependent. In this case there are periodic oscillations
where excess harvesting, lax regulation and low biomass levels, are succeeded
by reduced harvesting, more stringent regulation and recovery of stocks. In
our model the mechanism driving periodic oscillations is the interaction be-
tween stock eﬀects on proﬁts, the stringency of regulation measured in terms
of the movements of the subjective auditing probabilities as stocks change,
and evolutionary adoption of harvesting rules.
Combined stock and regulatory ﬂuctuations, leading to eventual collapse,
have been observed in ﬁsheries. The Canadian cod ﬁshery oﬀ the east coast
of Newfoundland experienced its boom-bust phase in the mid-1950s.. With
the appearance of a new breed of factory-ﬁshing, countries such as Germany
(East and West), Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, Poland, the Soviet Union,
Cuba and countries in east Asia had legally ﬁshed to within 12 miles of
the eastern Canadian and New England (US) seaboards. Canada (and the
US), concerned that stocks were being reduced to almost nothing, passed
legislation in 1976 to extend their national jurisdictions over marine living
resources out to 200 nautical miles. Catches naturally declined in the late
1970’s and stocks started recovering after the departure of the foreign ﬂeets.
18However national regulation did not set catch quotas at the late 1970’s levels,
and furthermore new technology in the form of factory-trawlers, or draggers
as they became known, became the mainstay of Canada’s Atlantic oﬀshore
ﬁshing ﬂeet. Thus the northern cod catch began a steady rise again as a
result, with a corresponding decline in stocks. By 1986 the stock decline was
realized and by 1988 there were scientiﬁc opinions recommending that the
total allowable catch be cut in half. Possibly because of delayed regulatory
response, by 1992 the biomass estimate for northern cod was the lowest ever
measured. The Canadian Minister of Fisheries and Oceans had no choice but
to declare a ban on ﬁshing northern cod. For the ﬁr s tt i m ei n4 0 0y e a r st h e
ﬁshing of northern cod ceased in Newfoundland. The ﬁsheries department
issued a warning in 1995 that the entire northern cod population had declined
to just 1,700 tonnes by the end of 1994, down from a 1990 biomass survey
showing 400,000 tonnes (Greenpeace 2003).
The evolutionary framework developed in this paper can be regarded
as providing support for such observed ﬂuctuations in the stocks and the
stringency or eﬀectiveness of regulation.
In terms of our model, oscillations can be eliminated and a full compli-
ance steady state can be achieved by suﬃciently high ﬁnes. If ﬁnes suﬃciently
high to take the CPR out of the trap of low stock oscillations and insuﬃ-
cient compliance are not feasible, because of say political reasons, then such
ﬂuctuations around a low stock will be persistent, and collapse might occur.
Comparing precommitment to auditing and partial commitment to au-
diting, it can be stated that a full compliance equilibrium can be achieved if
the regulator is precommitted to announced ﬁxed auditing probabilities. In
this case there are combinations of ﬁnes/auditing probabilities that could at-
tain the full compliance equilibrium. Thus if the regulator does not have the
complete freedom to adjust ﬁnes due to political reasons the full compliance
result can be achieved by increasing the auditing probability.
19Appendix
Proof of Proposition 3
On the Existence of a Limit Cycle
We proceed in three steps.
1. First we show that point E in ﬁgure 4a is unstable. The linearization






















0 (S∗) > 0. Thus
tr(J) > 0,D e t (J) > 0. So there are two real positive characteristic
roots and point E is unstable.
2. Then we show that a closed trajectory cannot be ruled out in a sim-
ply connected region,27,l i k eM in ﬁgure 4a, containing the isolated
critical point E. This can be accomplished by using Bendixson’s crite-
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does not change sign in a simply connected region containing E. Thus
Bendixson’s criterion implies that a closed trajectory cannot be ruled
out in the region containing E.
3. Finally we construct the positively invariant set R where the ﬂow of the
vector ﬁeld (26), (27) points inwards into R on the boundaries of R as
shown in ﬁgure 4a. More precisely a trapping positively invariant region
like the quadrilateral R can be constructed in the following way The




˙ xN, ˙ S
´
< 028 where (η1,η 2)
0 is the outward pointing normal
on the boundary of R. Region R is deﬁned by segments of straight lines
xN = k1l + k2jS, j =1 ,2,3,4. The outward pointing normals for the
27A simply connected region is a region that can be (smoothly) contracted to a point.
Thus a simply connected region cannot have more that one "blob" and that blob cannot
have any holes in its interior. See for example Sastry (1999, Ch. 2.3).
28(η1,η2)
0 denotes a column vector.
20lines k1l + k2jS are deﬁned as (η1,η 2)































˙ xN + ˙ S<0 ,j=1 ,2,3, (33)
then the vector ﬁeld (26), (27) points inward on the boundary of the
region R. Assume that a region R
0 satisﬁes the above conditions. Then
since E is unstable and it is the only critical point inside R, we can
deﬁne a region like U around E where the ﬂow of the vector ﬁeld (26),
(27) point outwards on the boundary of U. Then by the Bendixon-
Poincare theorem a limit cycle exists in region R
0.
Polymorphic Compliance Equilibrium for S∗ >S msy
We consider the linearization matrix J with F

























Let δ =[ tr(J)]
2−4[Det(J)]. From standard stability analysis of dynamical
systems in two dimensions we have:
















then the steady state is a stable focus.
• If Det(J) > 0,δ>0, then the steady state is a stable node with non
linear trajectory paths.
• If Det(J) > 0 < 0, then the steady state is a saddle point.
¥
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